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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5097
This paper applies a growth diagnostics approach to 
identify the most binding constraints to private-sector 
growth in Malawi—a small, landlocked country in 
Southern Africa with one of the lowest per capita 
incomes in the world. The approach aims to identify the 
constraints (in terms of public policy, implementation, 
and investments) most binding on marginal investment, 
and therefore whose relaxation would have the largest 
impact on growth through the investment channel.
   The authors find that growth in Malawi has been 
primarily driven by the domestic multiplier effect from 
export revenues. The multiplier effect is particularly 
pronounced due to the high number of smallholder 
farmers, which produce Malawi’s main export crop, 
tobacco, and consequently results in the widespread 
and rapid transmission of agricultural export income. 
This paper—a product of Southern Africa Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to analyze constraints to growth and poverty reduction. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at nick.lea@kuona-consult.com, 
l-hanmer@dfid.gov.uk, or jverbeek@worldbank.org. 
Furthermore, despite changes in the structure of 
agricultural production from estate to smallholder 
farming and liberalization of prices and finance, a 
longstanding relationship persists between exports in real 
domestic currency and overall gross domestic product. 
This central role of exports in creating domestic demand 
highlights the importance of the real exchange rate 
in Malawi’s growth story, which directly increases the 
strength of the export multiplier. 
   The most pressing constraint to growth in Malawi 
continues to be the regime of exchange rate management. 
Despite good progress, there is compelling evidence that 
the rate is still substantially overvalued. Furthermore, it 
is also likely that the inflow of foreign aid—in excess of 
50 percent of exports—contributes to the overvaluation 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Growth is not an end in itself. But it makes it possible to achieve other important 
objectives of individuals and societies. It can spare people en masse from poverty and 
drudgery.  Nothing else ever has.  It also creates the resources to support health care, 
education, and the other Millennium Development Goals to which the world has 
committed itself.  In short, we take the view that growth is a necessary, if not 
sufficient, condition for broader development, enlarging the scope for individuals to be 
productive and creative.” 
  
The Growth Report, Commission on growth and development, 2008 
 
Malawi is a landlocked, densely-populated country in Southern Africa where per capita 
annual income currently stands at around $290 (IMF, 2008).  The population is highly 
rural; agricultural production is predominately subsistence; and due to having a single 
rainfall season and limited irrigation, the country experienced food shortages in 1994, 
2002 and 2005.  Furthermore, unlike many of its neighbors, Malawi has not benefited 
from significant mineral endowments, and its export corridors to the ports in 
Mozambique have yet to be repaired from the damage done by that country’s civil war. 
 
Growth performance has been strong in recent years.  GDP grew at 6.7% in 2006, 8.6% 
in 2007 and 9.7% in 2008.  Growth is projected to fall to around 6% in 2009 and 2010.  
While recent performance is good by any standards, Malawi’s growth has a history of 
volatility, and recovery from the recession of the 1980s was slow compared to other 
countries in the region.  Furthermore as a small, low income landlocked economy, export 
growth is vital if Malawi is to achieve the sustained increases in GDP needed to reduce 
poverty.  Again, until very recently Malawi’s export growth performance has been 
sluggish by regional standards. 
  
Figure 1: GDP and export growth in context 
Real GDP per capita 1978=100 














Real exports % increase, 
1996-2006
     Source: WDI   - 3 - 
 
        
A.  GROWTH HISTORY 
The history of growth in Malawi since 1960 can be characterized by four distinct phases: 
(a) 1960-79 estate-based growth; (b) 1979-89 decline; (c) 1989-02 stagnation due to 
shocks and transition to smallholder led growth; and (d) 2002-08 recovery.  The 
evolution of per capita GDP from 1960 to 2006 is plotted in Figure 2. It shows a period 
of strong growth between 1960 and 1979 followed by a more or less secular decline in 
standards of living until 1989. Macro-instability and external shocks create volatility and 
stagnation in the period to 2002, and growth resumes in the most recent phase 2002-08. 
 
Figure 2: Phases of GDP per capita in Malawi 1960-2008 
Sources:  GDP per capita - WDI 1960-1993, NSO 1994-2008, using population from WDI;    
Inflation: WDI 1960-1979 (from GDP deflator), IMF 1980-2008 (from CPI);   
Terms of trade: WDI rebased to 2000=100 
Estate-based Growth: 1960-1979  
The high growth period of the 1960s and 1970s was founded on export agriculture, with 
estates producing export crops and smallholders producing food and supplying cheap 
labor to the estates.  Government policies supported large-scale agriculture, affording 
them preferential access to land, investment and credit (Harrigan, 2003).  The monopoly 
state marketing board ADMARC channeled profits into the estate sector, subsidized 
investment in industry and supported smallholder production and consumption of food 
through cross subsidies (Harrigan, 1991; Harrigan 2003; Kydd and Christiansen, 1982).  
During this period estates grew at an average annual rate of 17% while smallholder 
production grew at 3%.  Smallholder income was supplemented by remittances from 
migrant labor.  The condition of transport infrastructure was relatively good and 95% of 
Malawi’s exports were routed via the Mozambican ports of Nacala and Beira. 
Decline: 1979-89 
Following the oil price shock at the end of the seventies, the terms-of-trade collapsed by 
25% beginning a long deteriorating trend.  As commodity prices fell, so did demand in - 4 - 
 
South Africa for migrant labor, reducing remittance incomes of Malawian households.  
Civil war in Mozambique 1985-1992 damaged transport infrastructure and blocked the 
ports of Nacala and Beira raising transport costs.  Additionally high financial losses of 
ADMARC and other parastatals - exacerbated by poor sequencing of price and market 
liberalization  - resulted in the steep decline of living standards between 1979 and the late 
1980s (Harrigan, 2003).   
 
This rise and fall of incomes between 1960 and the late eighties points to the dominant 
role of producer terms-of-trade.  Estate-led growth was made possible by relatively high 
product prices, the efficient value chain of estate marketing, good transport infrastructure 
and cheap credit.  The reversal of these factors between 1979 and 1989 correspondingly 
contracted incomes. 
Volatility and Transition to Smallholder Growth: 1989-02 
Agricultural reform began in the early 1990s and dismantled many of the constraints 
imposed on smallholders by the estate-led model.  The repeal of the Special Crops Act 
made it legal for smallholders to grow export crops bringing about a dramatic shift in the 
sector - from nearly nothing in 1990, smallholders now produce around 70% of the 
tobacco crop.  However growth was volatile in the face of increasing macro-instability 
and exacerbated by various external shocks:  droughts in 1992 and 1994; an increased 
influx of Mozambican refugees and, suspension of all Western non-humanitarian aid in 
1992-3 (Harrigan, 2003).   
 
Inflation reached a high of 83% in 1995 and was only brought under control to around 
10% in 2003.  The much needed liberalization of the exchange rate in 1994 was not 
accompanied by fiscal discipline (partly explained by the electoral cycle) and hence 
higher import prices immediately fed through into the CPI.  Excessive government 
borrowing financed by domestic treasury bills resulted in real interest rates exceeding 
20% between 2000 and 2004.  For part of this period Malawi had the notoriety of having 
real interest rates among the highest in the world.   Private investment was crowded out, 
growth was damaged. 
Stabilization and Recovery: 2002-08  
The change of government in 2004 brought about a rapid turnaround in government 
finances.  In extremely difficult fiscal circumstances, and for the first time since 1994, the 
government stayed within the budget approved by parliament (Whitworth 2005).  As a 
result government expenditure stabilized and the fiscal deficit improved dramatically. 
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Figure 3: Government deficit and domestic debt 
Source: IFS, IMF Country Report No. 08/3, Jan 2008 
 
 
Despite continued falls in the terms of trade, growth and exports began to recover in 
2003, and by 2007 GDP per capita had regained its level achieved in 1979.  The recovery 
had taken 28 years.  This paper attempts to identify the key constraints to growth to 
ensure that Malawi’s recent growth continues, and how the country can achieve sustained 
faster growth in the medium term. 
 
II.  GROWTH DYNAMICS 
B.  METHODOLOGY 
The analysis framework used in this paper is the growth diagnostic approach of 
Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005), a methodology for identifying the principal 
obstacles to an economy’s optimal rate of capital growth.  In particular the approach aims 
to identify those constraints most binding on the marginal investment, and therefore 
whose relaxation would have the largest impact on growth through the investment 
channel.  The authors propose that economic growth is a function of the returns to asset 
accumulation, the extent to which they can be privately appropriated, less the cost of 
financing this accumulation.  In this framework, growth can thus be constrained by: 
 
a)  Low social returns through lack of complementary factors such as infrastructure, 
human capital, low total factor productivity or unfavorable externalities. 
b)  Poor appropriability through high taxation, poor property rights, weak contract 
enforcement, labor conflicts, incomplete information, or other market failures 
c)  High cost of capital through domestic financial markets or external ones 
 
The approach is grounded in the standard economic theory expressed in the Ramsey 
model.  The equation states that the optimal growth path of consumption and capital is 
determined by: 
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where:       
    c, c   is consumption, and the derivative of consumption with respect to time. 
    k, k   is capital, and the derivative of capital with respect to time. 
      is the tax rate on investment returns, actual or expected, formal or informal 
      is the world rate of interest 
      is the elasticity of intertemporal elasticity in consumption
2 
    r  is a function of  a, , x representing the rate of return on capital where: 
    a  is the indicator of total factor productivity 
    x  is the availability of complementary factors of production such as infrastructure or 
human capital 
      is the index of externality (a higher  means a larger distortion) 
 
Growth diagnostics consists of analyzing the parameters of the optimization equation to 
assess which are the most binding to growth.  However the data required to empirically 
estimate most of these parameters is rarely available in developing countries, therefore 
the exercise becomes one of carefully using available data as proxies.  For example a 
constraint may be binding if historical movements in the constraint produce significant 
movements in growth; if the shadow price
3 of the constraint is high; if agents in the 
economy are engaging in significant efforts to bypass the constraint; or if activities less 
obstructed by the constraint are seen to grow or survive.  Constraints in ex-ante risks 
(such as the anticipation of expropriation) may be signaled by high current profits failing 
to trigger entry of other firms.  
 
Although the original methodology focused on identifying a single binding constraint – 
perhaps in reaction to the traditional laundry list approach which disregarded country 
context – subsequent versions of the HRV have stressed a set of interacting binding 
constraints.  For example poor financial intermediation for smallholder agriculture 
combined with poor links to export markets can compound the problems faced by 
farmers seeking to diversify into higher earning export crops. 
                                                 
 
2 Investment is deferred consumption.  The parameter indicates the population’s elasticity for deferment of 
consumption. 
3 A shadow price is the change in the price (objective function) due to a relaxation of a constraint at the 
margin (by one unit) - 7 - 
 
Figure 4: The HRV Constraints Matrix 
 
Source: Hausmann (2007) 
 
Taking the Ramsey model, the framework proposes an extensible matrix of checks which 
form the basis of the analysis in later sections.  First we use historical data on output, 
prices, and production to investigate the governing dynamics of growth and to answer the 
question of what has driven and what currently drives growth in Malawi. 
 
C.  WHAT HAS DRIVEN GROWTH? 
In 2007 after 28 years, incomes per capita recovered their level of 1979.  The 
deterioration of the terms-of-trade and infrastructure damage in Mozambique clearly 
played a large part in this collapse, yet incomes have recovered without an accompanying 
recovery in the terms-of-trade.  Over the 28 years, the economy has moved from export-
orientated estate-agriculture to being led by smallholder production. This section 
discusses the drivers of long-run growth with particular attention to the recent recovery. 
 
Growth in Malawi is dominated by agriculture, and recently has seen an increasing 
contribution from domestic services.  Between 1995 and 2003 agriculture accounted for 
nearly three-quarters of all economic growth (see Table 1).  After 1995, there is a general 
pattern of falling growth rates until reaching a low point during the drought of 2001/02, 
followed by a gradual resumption output growth.  However growth since 2004 has been 
structurally different, being composed of increasingly important contributions from - 8 - 
 
distribution, finance, construction and manufacturing.  The headline data on trade also 
shows an equivalent change in dynamic: whilst exports have stayed within the region of 
20 percent of GDP, the trade deficit has significantly worsened and since 2003 has 
exceeded 10 percent of GDP. 
 
Table 1: GDP and sources of growth 
   95  96  97  98  99  00   01   02   03   04   05   06   07  
National Account ($US m) 
      GDP  ($US  m)  1,925 3,149 3,669 2,451 2,447 2,402 2,365 2,665 2,425 2,625 2,755 2,917 3,324 
      Exports,  fob  ($US  m)  444 510 539 539 447 402 427 414 433 499 509 543 706 
   Imports, fob ($US m)  508  588  697  497  573  460  471  595  684  810  1,006  1,055  1,182 
Trade ratios (as percentage of GDP) 
      Exports  (fob)  23.1 16.2 14.7 22.0 18.3 16.7 18.0 15.5 17.9 19.0 18.5 18.6 21.2 
      Imports  (fob)  26.4 18.7 19.0 20.3 23.4 19.2 19.9 22.3 28.2 30.9 36.5 36.2 35.6 
   Trade balance  -3.3  -2.5  -4.3  1.7  -5.1  -2.4  -1.9  -6.8  -10.3  -11.8  -18.0  -17.6  -14.3 
  
Growth  in  GDP  (factor  cost)  13.8  10.0 6.6 3.0 1.6 0.8  -3.9 1.9 3.9 5.1 2.2 8.6 9.2 
      Agriculture  9.8 7.8 0.0 5.3 1.6 2.0  -2.4 1.0 2.3 1.1  -3.5 4.3 3.5 
   Mining, quarrying  0.0  1.5  -0.4  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  -0.6  0.2  0.5  0.8  -0.5  0.0 
      Manufacturing  0.9  -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2  -0.4  -1.8 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.0 
      Electricity,  water  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1  -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
      Construction  0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0  -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.9 
      Distribution  0.6  -0.2 3.7  -1.6  -0.4  -0.1 0.2 0.3  -0.2 1.4 2.8 1.8 1.3 
      Transport,  communications  0.9  -0.4 0.4 0.0 0.2  -0.2 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.3 
      Financial,  professional  0.7 1.3 2.5  -0.7 0.0 0.2  -0.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 1.7 1.1 
      Ownership  of  dwellings  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
      Government  services  1.0  -0.3 0.2  -0.5  -0.2  -1.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.6 
Source: NSO 1994 series of accounts.  GDP is from 2002 series back-adjusted using the 1994 series rates of growth.   
 
Maize Production 
Agricultural production and policy is dominated by maize.  Although there has been 
some diversification and a notable increase in smallholder tobacco production, the area 
under maize cultivation is still roughly equivalent to that of all other crops combined.  
Over 60 percent of national calorie consumption derives from maize; 97 percent of 
farmers grow maize; and over half of households grow no other crop
4.  Given Malawi’s 
vulnerability to drought, the maize harvest is thus central to the welfare of the population, 
and one of the most important political and social variables.  This is reflected by the 
prominence of food security in public policy.  Through the Fertilizer Subsidy Program, 
the government has made increasing maize yields the mainstay of agricultural policy, and 
has designated it a “strategic crop” subject to import and export bans (more recently 
intervening to set the domestic price).  Together with good rains, the increased use of 
fertilizer has increased yields and in the last three seasons has substantially strengthened 
food security.  Given the prominence of maize production in the national dialogue, it 
seems a reasonable hypothesis that the maize harvest has had a large impact on GDP. 
 
Yet despite the prevailing assumption of the centrality of maize in the economy, the 
maize harvest drives volatility but does not dominate growth.  The per-capita maize 
harvest is plotted alongside GDP
5 in Figure 5.  Following the end of UNFAO monitoring 
                                                 
 
4 Integrated Household Survey, 2005 and Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment, World Bank, 2006.   
5 The comparison of production weight against value-added is justified here since this series of National 
Accounts uses fixed baseline prices to construct GDP. - 9 - 
 
of crop estimates in 2005, a downwards adjustment of 10% is applied to the harvest in 
2006 and of 20% for the harvests of 07 and 08.  This reflects evidence from trade and 
price data, and the consistent opinion among observers in the development community 
that methodological problems have inflated estimates for these years
6.   
 
Figure 5: Per Capita Maize Harvest and GDP 
Source: NSO, Ministry of Agriculture and World Bank Staff 
 
Although clear that very poor harvests are associated with contractions in output 
(GDP/cap fell by 8.5 percent in 1992 and by 9.6 percent in 1994) the correlation is 
weaker in years of good harvest.  Clearly maize contributes to GDP – by definition – but 
strong maize harvests alone do not inevitably create strong overall growth.  The scatter 
plot in Figure 5 shows the two series omitting the data for 2006-08.  Linear regression
7 
gives an explanatory power of 23% (R
2=0.226) for the association of maize harvest with 
GDP which increases to 24% when the adjusted figures for 06-08 are included.  These 
low correlation scores imply that the maize harvest, while central to welfare in Malawi, 
contributes to GDP but does not dominate the dynamics of growth. 
 
One explanation for this limited correlation is the high proportion of output which is 
consumed by the producer and which never reaches the market.  The majority of 
smallholders in Malawi are subsistence farmers and market minimal surplus, thus 
although this production increases GDP by the amount produced, its multiplier effect is 
limited.  The Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment (World Bank, 2006) estimates that 
only 10-15% of the total crop is sold, that around half (52%) of small holders sell some of 
their output on the market, but that only 18% sell more than half of their output.  A 
further reason is the low net profitability of maize production using fertilizer at current 
prices.  Although the application of fertilizer increases yields, its effect on smallholder 
                                                 
 
6 The National Statistical Office plans to revise agricultural GDP when the imminent agricultural census is 
released. 
7 In common with other HRV analyses (e.g. Klinger, 2007) we use X-Y correlation plots of per capita 
variables.  This approach does not correct for trending but observations are joined by line in date order so 
that any trending is immediately visible. (1-R
2) gives the contributing variance of the residual. - 10 - 
 
value added is limited since the increased production is offset by significantly increased 
input costs. This is discussed in detail later in the agricultural chapter which performs a 
profitability analysis for several configurations of smallholder maize farming.  The study 
estimates that at recent prices, the net profitability of farming maize using hybrid seeds 




The second candidate driver of growth is exports.  Malawi’s exports are dominated by 
tobacco (60% of domestic export revenue 1994-2008 in nominal USD) followed by 
sugar, tea, cotton and more recently apparel.  Like GDP, export income has undergone 
dramatic shifts since 1960 and has recently grown strongly thanks to the performance of 
tobacco in 2008.  Figure 6 correlates per capita exports in real dollars against per capita 
GDP.  We seek to clarify whether exports have driven growth – not only through their 
intrinsic contribution to output – but also through the demand effect created by revenues 
multiplying out through the rest of the economy.  Exports at constant prices from 
traditional national accounts (i.e. those that don’t implement chained pricing) are 
unsuited to this task because the methodology fixes prices at a specific base year thus 
functioning as an index of quantity. 
 
Figure 6: Exports in real USD and GDP (1960-2007) 
Source: NSO, WDI and World Bank Staff estimates. 
 
However, changes in the export price are critical to any multiplier effect and so the series 
plotted in Figure 6 is constructed using current USD revenue deflated by US consumer 
prices.  Nevertheless the relationship with GDP is partial.  Although there is a clear 
correlation between the two series in the years 1960-1980, the relationship breaks down 
after 1982, and there is little discernable dependence.  At first sight this would indicate 
that recent growth has not been governed by export dynamics but rather by endogenous 
forces within the domestic economy. 
 - 11 - 
 
Yet the demand effect of export revenues is exerted on the domestic economy relative to 
domestic prices, not those in the US.  A very different picture emerges if the export series 
is expressed in real kwacha rather than in real dollars – that is current export revenue in 
kwacha deflated by the Malawian CPI.  
 
Figure 7: Exports in real MK and GDP (1960-2007) 
Source: NSO, WDI and World Bank Staff estimates. 
 
Export revenues expressed in real kwacha are strongly correlated with GDP with an 
explanatory power of 79% (R
2 =0.791).  This is consistent with the demand effect of 
export income acting as the dominant driver of growth through its multiplier effects in the 
rest of the economy.  There are grounds to take this hypothesis seriously.  Firstly, as 
already discussed, the prevalence of subsistence farming restricts the demand effect from 
smallholder agriculture (the largest sector of the economy) to the portion of production 
that is marketed.  Secondly, there is the dominant role of the distribution sector, which is 
highly sensitive to trade volumes. An increase in export crops increases distribution 
activity from smallholders, exporters and eventually importers once foreign exchange 
becomes available.  And lastly, it is because of the reported substantial increase in sales 
by rural retail networks in years where cash crop income from smallholders is high 
(particularly from tobacco). 
 
It is unlikely that causality runs the other way around – GDP growth causing a rise in real 
domestic export income – because of the significant role of exogenous export prices.  
Neither do we observe covariant behavior between the export and domestic agriculture 
sectors.  The maize harvest is nearly perfectly independent from the amount of tobacco 
brought to the auction floors.  This lack of correlation with domestic agriculture signals 
that the relationship between domestic export income and GDP is likely to be a causal 
one. - 12 - 
 
Figure 8: Maize and tobacco production are independent 
 
    Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Tobacco Control Commission 
 
Furthermore, despite the structural shift away from estates towards smallholder 
production, and the changes in macro and financial environments, this relationship 
appears to hold over the long term.  Figure 9 presents export and GDP data for the recent 
period 1990-2008. 
Figure 9: Exports/cap and GDP/cap (1990-2008) 
 
Source: NSO, WDI and World Bank Staff estimates. 
 
The relationship continues to be significant with an explanatory power of 67.5%.  It is 
possible that macro-instability accounts for the lowering of this correlation since 
performing the regression excluding the three years of highest inflation (1994-6, 1999) 
improves the fit to 76%.  The data suggests that exports drive growth through the 
multiplier effect, and that for an additional 1% increase in the real domestic value of 
exports, GDP increases by 1.9%.  The persistence of this effect over the long-term 
implies multiplier effects for both smallholder and estate production.  There is some 
evidence to support this: firstly much of the demand effect is exerted at the wholesale 
level for transport and finance which is independent of the production mode.  Secondly 
estates disburse cash wages (albeit meager) to a large labor force which creates demand 
effects observable through the increased retail activity in districts with large tea estates 
such as Thyolo, and around the sugar estates such as Dwangwa. - 13 - 
 
The Real Exchange Rate 
The importance of exports expressed in real kwacha rather than real dollars highlights the 
importance of the real exchange rate in Malawi’s growth story. The two series of real 
exports are defined as nominal exports deflated by the price level – in this case the CPI - 
of the relevant country: 
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Because the ratio between nominal exports in MK to nominal exports in USD is simply 

















    
 
Where is e(t) is the nominal price of MK in USD.  In other words, the two series are 
related to each other via the reciprocal of the MK:USD real exchange rate, (t). 
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Thus a devaluation of the real exchange rate increases the real domestic value of exports 
relative to the real dollar value.   To illustrate quite how important this variable has been 
for growth, Figure 10 plots per capita exports in both real dollars and real kwacha. 
 
Figure 10: Real exports and the real exchange rate 
 Source: WDI, World Bank Staff calculations 
 
The two series track each other reasonably well until 1994 when kwacha exports sharply 
depart from the dollar series.  The improvement is due to a steady depreciation of the real 
exchange rate – shown on the graph by the rise in its reciprocal.  This depreciation has - 14 - 
 
increased the real kwacha value of exports by about 2.5 times since the exchange rate 
levels of the 1970s.  Because, as we have seen, GDP is highly sensitive to export 
revenues in real kwacha, this management of the exchange rate is very likely to have had 
a large beneficial effect on incomes, and more than any other policy instrument, enabled 
Malawi to grow in a hostile terms-of-trade environment. 
 
That said, the data implies that prior to liberalization in 1994, the formal exchange rate 
was greatly overvalued, and Malawi could only have experienced such high growth in the 
seventies due to exceptionally favorable export prices.    It is also clear that although the 
long-term trend has been positive, the management of the rate has been volatile.  Sharp 
step devaluations couple with inadequate fiscal discipline have rapidly transmitted into 
domestic prices causing the real exchange rate to depreciate and then re-appreciate, and 
this instability is likely to have disrupted growth by increasing uncertainty in real export 
prices.  Partly as a result of this, the government has used the nominal exchange rate as a 
stabilization instrument, implementing a slow crawling peg to the US dollar since 2006. 
 
Figure 11: Recent nominal exchange rates (rebased to 1 Jan 08 = 100) 
 
     Source: Oanda 
 
The sharp devaluation of most global currencies against the dollar since August 2008 has 
resulted in a very significant appreciation of the Malawian kwacha against its main 
trading counterparts, and an opening of the gap between formal and informal exchange 
rates
8.  During 2008 the real exchange rate appreciated by 20, 10, and 40 percent against 
the South African rand, the Euro, and the British pound, respectively.  Given the 
sensitivity of the economy to this variable, stable management of the real rate and 




                                                 
 
8 As of February 2009 there was a 30% premium between the official rate and the informal market rate - 15 - 
 
Sources of Export Growth 
If export income has had such an impact on growth then what has driven exports?  Most 
export revenue has come from tobacco.  Tobacco has consistently dominated Malawi’s 
merchandise exports and, since 1994 has accounted for about 60% of revenue.   
 
Figure 12: Sources of exports per capita (real 1994 MK) 
  Source: NSO, Balance of Payments, deflated by the CPI (IMF) and population (WDI) 
 
Yet despite the evolving prices, the composition of exports has stagnated.  There has been 
virtually no change in the export basket since 1994 bar the nascent incursions of apparel, 
cotton and edible nuts.  These have expanded at an average per capita rate of 11% since 
1994 but combined still account for less than one tenth of total revenue. 
 
The volumes of non-tobacco agricultural exports as recorded in the balance of payments 
have shown less growth.  The production of sugar shows volatile but gradual growth, tea 
production is stagnant, and the exports of coffee and pulses show gradual decline.  At a 
low-level there has been rapid growth in the volume of cotton exports since 2003, and 
rice since 2006. 
Figure 13: Export Volumes (non-tobacco) 
 
     Source: NSO, Balance of Payments 
 - 16 - 
 
The vast majority of production expansion has come from tobacco.  What then has driven 
this growth?  Data from the Tobacco Control Commission reveals that production 
responds moderately to the real auction price of the previous year.  Note that the product 
sold at auction is “green form” tobacco directly from the smallholder or intermediate 
trader and that the exported product undergoes a level of processing which removes the 
leaf stem, cleans and evenly hydrates the product for transit.  
 
Figure 14: Tobacco price and production 
Source: Tobacco Control Commission of Malawi 
 
Prices in the preceding year account for just under 50% of the production response.   
Again, there is a better correlation between production and real domestic prices 
(R
2=45%) than production and dollar prices (R
2=35%) implying an additional growth 
dependency on the real exchange rate.  Smallholders respond to price signals with a price 
elasticity of supply of 0.61 - a 1% rise in the real domestic price at auction yields a 0.61% 
rise in the following year’s supply. 
 
Growth Dynamics 
In summary, a significant amount of growth can be accounted for by the domestic 
multiplier from export revenues.   Since 60% of export revenues are from tobacco, a high 
proportion of this feeds directly into the distribution, finance and smallholder sectors.  
Production growth in most exports appears relatively constrained, but there is an 
identifiable supply response in tobacco to prices in the previous year. 
 
This combination of GDP sensitivity to exports, and export volume sensitivity to prices 
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Since the real domestic price of exports is equal to the dollar price converted by the real 
exchange rate, a depreciation in the real exchange rate is likely to increase GDP both by 
increasing the supply response and by increasing real export revenue.  Alongside the 
domestic price of key exports, this analysis suggests that the real exchange rate has been, 
and continues to be, a central policy instrument of growth for Malawi. 
 
However, the role of agricultural exports in explaining growth together with a lack of 
diversification into new sectors reveals a key weakness of the economy. Recent growth 
can be explained in large part by rises in the tobacco price and improvements in the real 
exchange rate.  Yet expansion based on increased tobacco production does not appear to 
be a viable strategy for the medium to long term.  The majority of Malawi’s tobacco crop 
is burley which is used mainly as a neutral flavored filler in the market for high-end 
cigarettes.  Although expanding, there is a ceiling on world demand for such tobacco 
which the industry manages with care.   There are also industry indications that recent 
high prices are due to buyers having unwound their stocks and are now rebuilding.  It is 
unlikely that Malawi could multiply up tobacco production over the medium term 
without bringing about a decline in world market price. 
 
The lack of diversification into new export sectors puts heavy reliance on the tobacco 
channel, and commits the economy to growth constrained by world demand for a niche 
product.  A failure to diversify into new export products thus constrains Malawi’s growth 
and renders the economy vulnerable to adverse price shocks when they occur in the 
future.   
 
D.  THE PATTERN OF GROWTH 
How does export growth translate into general growth of the economy?  This section 
considers the transmission mechanism by looking at investment dynamics, sectoral 
behavior and aggregate demand. 
Investment 
The behavior of investment is difficult to map accurately in Malawi.  Methodological 
problems and a reluctance by firms to declare their plans has hampered formal sector 
efforts; and it has been extremely difficult to assess the investments – often in kind – of 
rural farmers.  Tiny outlays in livestock, soil fertility, curing barns, fruit trees are often - 18 - 
 
key to the underlying productivity of smallholder agriculture but no systematic attempt 
has yet been made to capture them.  The most accurate sources of investment data are 
plotted in Figure 15 (WDI 1990-2001, NSO 2002 series).  There are no reliable figures 
after 2005 but the NSO reports strong investment intentions in subsequent business 
surveys
9 and consequently expects a continued rise in investment as a share of GDP. 
 
Figure 15: Investment and imports of investment goods (% GDP) 
Source: NSO trade unit, NSO 2002 series, WDI (1990-2001) 
 
Data on machinery goods imports confirms an investment recovery from 2004 with 
continued strong performance in 2005/06 - particularly for vehicles in 2006 (non-
commercial vehicles are not separated out of the import data).  This recovery coincides 
with the sharp correction of real lending rates which fell from 43% in the third quarter of 
2003 to 22% a year later.  Similarly domestic credit to the private sector resumed growth 
in 2004 as fiscal discipline improved and reversed the crowding-out effect. 
 
Figure 16: Macro-environment and investment 
Source: IFS, WDI, NSO and World Bank staff estimates 
 
Is investment data consistent with the hypothesis that growth is driven by the domestic 
multiplier from export revenues?  At face value the two time series in Figure 16, seem 
                                                 
 
9 NSO conducts a Annual Economic Survey of businesses but which are not available to researchers. - 19 - 
 
weakly related.  However between 1995 and 2003 the macroeconomic environment was 
extremely hostile.  Nominal lending rates exceeded 45% for three-quarters of this period, 
and inflation peaked at over 90% early on in 1995.  It is extremely difficult for any 
private investment to weather such a macroeconomic winter, and thus plausible that 
investment failed to respond in this period due to this instability. 
 
Incorporating the dampening effect of macro-instability during 1993-2005, it is likely that 
investment - like output - is also affected by the demand effect from export revenues.  
Although investment data is not disaggregated, the next section investigates the output 
response of each sector.  The pattern of growth is indicative of the factors which 
constrain growth. 
Sectoral Pattern 
The sectoral pattern of GDP confirms a lack of transmission during the macro-instability 
of 1993-2003, and presents growth diffusing through the sectors starting with agriculture.  
The pattern is particularly clear from 2002 where growth resumes in agriculture and 
diffuses through to financial services, distribution, manufacturing, transport/ 
communications and eventually through to construction.   
 
Table 2: Sectoral contributions to growth in GDP 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
              
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  7.8%  0.0%  5.3%  1.6%  2.0%  -2.4%  1.0%  2.3%  1.1%  -3.5%  4.3%  3.5% 
Financial and Professional Services  1.3%  2.5%  -0.7% 0.0% 0.2%  -0.2% 0.5%  0.5%  0.8%  0.7%  1.7%  1.1% 
Distribution -0.2%  3.7%  -1.6% -0.4% -0.1%  0.2%  0.3% -0.2%  1.4%  2.8%  1.8%  1.3% 
Manufacturing  -0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%  -0.4%  -1.8% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8%  0.9%  0.7%  1.0% 
Transport  and  Communications  -0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 0.2%  -0.2% 0.1% 0.6%  0.4% 0.4% 0.5%  0.4%  1.3% 
Construction  0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0%  -0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.9% 
Producers  of  Government  Services  -0.3% 0.2%  -0.5%  -0.2%  -1.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 
Electricity  and  Water  0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%  -0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Private  Social  and  Community  Services  0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Ownership  of  Dwellings  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Mining and Quarrying  1.5%  -0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%  -0.6% 0.2% 0.5%  0.8%  -0.5% 0.0% 
Unallocable  Finance  Charges  -0.1% -0.4%  0.1% -0.3% -0.1%  0.1% -0.5% -0.3% -0.6% -0.7% -0.7% -0.7% 
              
Growth  in  GDP  at  Factor  cost  10.0% 6.6% 3.0% 1.6% 0.8%  -3.9% 1.9% 3.9% 5.1% 2.2% 8.6% 9.2% 
 
Source: National Statistics Office, National Accounts 1994-2007 
 
The largest contribution to growth comes from agriculture, nearly all of which is 
attributed to the smallholder sector.  Although likely that smallholder output has been 
overestimated
10, the sales of rural retail networks and recent growth in livestock indicate 
that significant rural growth is taking place. 
 
However other factors have been in play alongside the stimulus from agriculture.   
Financial reform since the 1980s catalyzed growth in the banking sector enabling the 
number of banks to expand from two in 1994 to nine in 2008. A relaxation of state 
                                                 
 
10 Small holder production of root crops and more recently of maize may be significantly overstated.  The 
Agricultural Census for 2007 compiled by the NSO is due to be released soon which will enable 
triangulation of these estimates. - 20 - 
 
ownership of manufacturing coupled with trade reforms caused an adjustment contraction 
in manufacturing in the late 1990s.  The five sectors of distribution, finance, transport/ 
communications, manufacturing and construction account for practically all recent 
growth outside of agriculture.  Distribution contributed most to this growth - 
predominantly a passive response to increased international trade and growth in 
agriculture.  Financial services have also accelerated – particularly from 2006 – and 
finally construction responded strongly in 2007.  
 
Figure 17: Non-agricultural sources of growth 
Source: NSO National Accounts 1994-2007 
 
The stagnation of the electricity and water sector since 1995 – which in per capita terms 
represents a steady contraction - despite the expansion of user industries and the 
prevalence of load shedding is an early signal of a supply constraint. 
Tradeables and the Import Boom 
Demand generated by growth in agriculture has created a strong response from non-
tradeable services but only a muted response from domestic manufacturing.  Although 
expansion resumed in the sector in 2003, its per capita growth has since averaged only 
3.7% and is yet to reclaim its level of 1995.  
 
Figure 18: Manufacturing value-added per capita (const 1994 MK) 
Source: NSO National Accounts 1994-2007 - 21 - 
 
 
This muted response is important.  Production for the domestic market, ISI (Import-
Substituting Industrialization) is naturally protected from external competition by the 
relatively high costs of importing into a landlocked country
11; and its slow growth 
contrasts sharply with a strong rise in imports.  According to provisional figures from the 
NSO, imports have doubled over the last five years in nominal dollar terms.  The sluggish 
performance of domestic manufacturing cannot therefore be blamed on a lack of 
aggregate demand. 
 
Figure 19: Imports and sources of foreign exchange (current $US) 
Source: NSO Balance of Payments, Figures for 07 and 08 are provisional 
 
How was such an import boom financed?  Principally it was through the foreign 
exchange generated by exports, aid and the errors and omissions.  The depletion of 
foreign exchange reserves has also contributed falling to 1.3 months of import cover by 
the end of 2008.  The combination of exports and official transfers fell short of funding 
imports in 2004-06 which looks to have been closed by the contribution from errors and 
omissions.  This account is unusually large, often exceeding 10% of GDP and could 
refer to capital flight, unregistered aid, informal trade or simply mistakes.  It seems likely 
that the account includes a proportion of repatriated capital since the flow reverses at the 
end of the inflationary period from a $200m outflow 1998-2001 to a similar sized inflow 
2002-06. 
 
The rise in imports since 2004 has been accompanied by a change in composition skewed 
towards consumption.  In real dollar terms consumption imports have increased by 86%, 
intermediate imports by 50% (mainly on account of fuel and fertilizer) and investment 
imports by only 29%.  In 2006 at over 14% of GDP, Malawi’s current account deficit was 




                                                 
 
11 In 2006, carriage insurance freight charge for imports was around 15% of their FOB value (NSO). - 22 - 
 
Figure 20: Import Composition and the external balance 
 
Source NSO Trade Data, IMF 
 
A boom in consumer imports and deterioration of the trade balance is a worrying signal 
in any economy.  What does it mean for Malawi?  Unlike larger and less open economies, 
this change of composition is unlikely to be a signal of an impending brake on growth 
due to a future foreign exchange constraint.  As already discussed, Malawi’s engine of 
growth is not endogenous demand but export income which has exhibited a relatively low 
dependence on import prices (although clearly imports feed into the general CPI).   
 
Rather, this expansion of consumption imports signals two things.  Firstly – assuming 
import elasticities are a good proxy for general elasticities – it confirms a low marginal 
propensity to invest.  An extra import expenditure of $1 would result in only 16c spent on 
investment goods.  Unlike the growth diagnostics for South Africa (Frankel, 2007) the 
data does not enable us to look at the sectoral decomposition of investment to determine 
the extent of capacity growth in tradeable sectors.  However if recent growth has been 
driven principally through improvements in real domestic export prices, then this low 
figure implies that future growth will also be constrained in this channel since investment 
rates appear insufficiently high to break out.   
 
Secondly it reveals a strong growth of consumption demand which - despite natural 
protection - has not created a response from domestic industry.  Taken together with the 
trade deficit and run down of reserves, this implies that the exchange rate is still 
overvalued. More recently banks have been forced to ration foreign currency to importers 
and the spread between formal and informal exchange rates has widened to 30%.  Over a 
longer term, there has been support for an overvaluation hypothesis in the literature.  
Rajan and Subramanian (2005) find Malawi’s exchange rate to be overvalued, but others 
have found that technical properties of the data have precluded the use of standard 
techniques to estimate equilibrium levels.  The switching of regimes contaminate the unit 
roots for purchasing power parity preventing it from reverting to a long-run equilibrium; 
and the lack of forward exchange markets prevents the use of interest rate parity 
(Mathisen, 2003). - 23 - 
 
The Role of Aid 
Has aid exacerbated the problem of overvaluation in Malawi?  Aiyar, Berg and Hussain 
(2008) present a framework for reasoning about aid which makes a distinction between 
aid absorption and aid spending.  Absorption is the degree to which aid currency finances 
net imports.  This is determined by the central bank in deciding whether to sell the 
foreign exchange to the private sector or to use it to build up reserves.  Aid spending is 
simply the degree to which the government uses the domestic currency raised from the 
sale of aid inflows to finance net expenditure.  The normal situation for aid recipients is 
that aid is both absorbed and spent, but Aiyar et al suggest that countries facing problems 
of stabilization could use aid to slow monetary growth by absorbing but not spending aid. 
 
Malawi has both absorbed and spent its aid inflows.  Figure 21 shows that since 2000, net 
aid inflows have been absorbed effectively into the non-aid current account deficit (that is 
the deficit excluding interest payments on external concessionary debt) with local 
deviations rapidly corrected in subsequent years.  Likewise aid entering the fiscal 
accounts after 2004 closely tracks the level of the pre-aid fiscal balance.  The budget 
crisis prior to 2004 which resulted in such high levels of domestic debt is evident in the 
widening gap between the two series between 2001 and 2004: aid levels fell and were 
consequently over-spent. 
 
Figure 21: Aid absorption and spending 
       Source: IMF and World Bank staff estimates 
 
The absorption of aid always requires an equivalent rise in import demand.  This can be 
done either directly by the government deciding to import more (or by receiving aid in 
kind) or, in a floating exchange rate, by raising aggregate import demand through 
appreciation of the RER.  In a fixed regime where there are shortages of foreign currency, 
the exchange rate may already be sufficiently overvalued to mask the effect of aid 
appreciation, in which case an aid inflow merely eases the shortage.  If a government 
decides to import directly there will be no appreciation effect; but if the central bank sells 
aid foreign currency to the private sector then the real exchange rate will need to 
appreciate.   
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Other things being equal this appreciation will lower profitability in the export sector, 
however the net medium-term growth effect of aid critically depends on how the 
government spends the inflow.  If aid facilitates an increase in productivity, then this will 
raise the real equilibrium exchange rate – the long-term rate at which the economy is 
competitive in international markets, achieves internal and external balance, and which 
defines whether the current rate is over or undervalued.  In other words, for its duration 
an aid inflow will appreciate the real exchange rate, but if it finances growth in 
productivity this doesn’t matter since the long-term equilibrium reference rate will also 
rise.  Note that this equilibrium rate moves only with structural changes in productivity, 
and not with temporary improvements such as the productivity gains derived from the 
current fertilizer program.  Adam and Bevin (2002) investigate the net effect of aid 
inflows on growth in Uganda using a CGE model, and conclude that the net growth effect 
is conditional on growth in productivity.  An increase in aid which does not ease supply-
side constraints – while generating growth through consumption – is likely to have a 
negative effect on competitiveness and hence growth. 
 
Cross-country data from the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD reveals 
that Malawi’s use of aid is comparable to that of its peers.  In 2006, aid per capita was 
$29, aid as a proportion of GDP was 13.6%, and aid as a ratio of merchandise exports 
stood at 74%.  Since the size of aid inflows relative to the external sector indicates the 
likely strength of the appreciation effect, this ratio puts Malawi among countries such as 
Uganda and Tanzania where the question of overvaluation due to aid has been 
sufficiently serious to provoke study (Asmah & Levin 2008, Adam & Bevin 2002). 
 
Figure 22: Malawian aid in context 
Sources: DAC: total net ODA disbursements, IMF: GDP and exports  
 
Aid as a percentage of GDP has risen steadily in Malawi and, since 1970, can be 
classified into three periods: 1970-86 averaging 4.6%; 1987-2002 averaging 9.0% 
although there is high volatility in this period due to inflation accounting; and since 2003 
averaging 12.4% of GDP.  The level of aid has no consistent correlation with GDP per 
capita - in fact the two series are nearly perfectly orthogonal – and the aid surge in 1987 
coincides with a bottoming out of the 1980s decline in incomes.   - 25 - 
 
Figure 23: Effects of aid on growth and competitiveness 
     Sources: DAC,IMF, NSO and World Bank staff estimates 
 
However, expressed as a proportion of exports aid nearly doubles between the period 
1970-86 (29%) and 1987-2007 (56%).  The transition between these two levels is 
associated with an appreciation of the real exchange rate which persisted until 1994.  This 
can be seen in Figure 23 which shows the long-term depreciating trend of the RER since 
1980 with a temporary appreciation coinciding with the step change in aid/exports in 
1986.  This is consistent with aid applying upward pressure on the RER in proportion to 
its size relative to exports, and this effect being eventually counterbalanced by longer 
term depreciation from factors such as progress toward trade and exchange liberalization, 
and changes in trade prices. 
 
One of factors mitigating the effects of appreciation is the proportion of government 
expenditures directly spent on imports.  Although no record of total government imports 
currently exists, in 2008/09 the fertilizer subsidy program alone was estimated at 4.6% of 
GDP or approximately one third of aid inflows.  Only a small component of this program 
was actually supported by aid, but aid inflows created the fiscal space which enabled 
implementation of the program and thus the net effect on import demand is as through it 
were directly financed.  Additionally the high proportion of project aid (about 75%) over 
budget aid is also likely to have increased the direct import component of government 
expenditure. 
Table 3: Composition of expenditures 
Percentage  of  GDP    2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
           
Aid inflow to the budget  4.3%  4.2%  8.2%  10.5%  12.8%  14.4%  12.3%   
                 
Total expenditures  22.4% 18.3% 23.0% 22.4% 28.2% 29.6% 33.7% 36.1% 
Current  Expenditures  16.7% 15.1% 19.0% 17.8% 22.2% 23.8% 28.1% 29.1% 
    Fertilizer program          1.7%  1.9%  2.7%  4.6% 
               
Capital Expenditures  5.8%  3.2%  4.0% 4.6% 5.9% 5.8% 5.6% 7.0% 
   Gross fixed capital formation  3.9%  3.1% 3.7% 4.3% 5.2% 5.2% 5.4% 5.0% 
 
Source: IMF, Public Finance National Reports, Government of Malawi Budget Documents 
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Yet the persistently low level of public investment implies that aid is not sufficiently 
financing supply-side improvements to increase productivity.  Whereas aid rose by 4.1% 
of GDP between 2003/04 and 2007/07, figures from the Ministry of Finance state that 
gross fixed capital formation only rose by 1.7%.  Similarly in aggregate, public 
investment only amounts to around 40% of aid inflows.  This implies that in excess of 
60% of aid (since some investment will have been domestically funded) is used for 
recurrent or consumption spending – greatly limiting its ability to increase productivity.    
  
The data is consistent with the theoretical prediction that aid exerts some appreciation 
effect on the currency caused by the need to increase private import demand, but this is 
mitigated by direct imports of the government’s fertilizer program, and probably by other 
aid funded projects with high import components.  It is thus unlikely that aid strongly 
constrains growth through competitiveness effects, but because of the small proportion of 
aid allocated to supply-side investment, it is also having limited positive effects on 
productivity.  Although Malawi currently uses aid for social development the data 
presented suggests that this aid only weakly supports growth.  This is a missed 
opportunity likely to prolong low levels of output and income, and dependence on 
external financing. 
 
Does Malawi Have a Syndrome? 
The analysis of Malawi’s growth dynamics reveals the following: 
 
1.  Growth is primarily driven by the domestic multiplier from export revenues. 
2.  Devaluation of the real exchange rate has had a strong beneficial effect on growth. 
3.  Growth has fed mainly into the non-tradeable service sectors and there has been 
very limited diversification into new export sectors or domestic ISI.  This is 
despite evidence of strong consumption demand from imports. 
4.  Macroeconomic instability 1995-2003 dampened investment and prevented 
growth transmission out of agriculture. 
5.  Import elasticities reveal a low marginal propensity to invest. 
6.  Relatively high aid flows have been absorbed into a large current account deficit 
(14% GDP). 
 
The lack of response from ISI or new export sectors in the face of booming consumer 
imports and low reserves of foreign exchange strongly implies that the exchange rate is 
still overvalued.  Despite dramatic improvements in the variable since 1980, it seems that 
there is still further to go.  The source of this overvaluation cannot all be attributed to 
foreign exchange income.  Although by law a managed float, the exchange rate remains 
de-facto a fixed regime with step devaluations.  Malawi persistently faces shortages of 
foreign exchange indicating that the overvaluation is at least partly due to the 
management of the fixed peg and may be influenced by reasons of welfare and political 
economy.  An overvalued exchange rate lowers the price of key goods such as fuel and 
fertilizer and provides the urban populations more access to consumer imports. - 27 - 
 
 
From this analysis the economy could be characterized by the syndrome “High-value 
monocrop export economy with overvalued exchange rate”.  This syndrome is a variant 
on Dutch Disease with the distinction that overvaluation is due as much to policy as to 
export revenues from the booming sector.  In such a case we would expect to see the 
following symptoms: 
 
  GDP is highly sensitive to crop export revenue, and crop price. 
  Over-valuation of the exchange rate undermines the competitiveness of non-
monocrop sectors. 
  Growth occurs only in non-traded service sectors without import competition. 
  There is low growth in import substituting industrialization because of 
competition from imports. 
  There is difficulty in developing new export industries due to the high 
profitability of the monocrop. 
 
These symptoms are demonstrably present in Malawi, and the economy has responded 
rapidly to improvements in the real exchange rate.  The state of the current account, high 
growth in consumer imports and the weak growth of ISI manufacturing are strong 
indications that further carefully managed devaluations of the real exchange rate would 
have beneficial effect. 
 
III.  HRV CONSTRAINTS MATRIX 
Although Malawi’s recent growth has been strong, the lack of investment in tradeable 
sectors, and smallholder productivity (particularly irrigation and livestock) raises 
questions of its sustainability and robustness.  In addition to the exchange rate, it is clear 
that other constraints operate which deter investment in external or domestic industries.  
The following section uses the HRV constraints matrix presented earlier to further 
analyze the causes of low investment and entrepreneurship in Malawi.  We discuss in 
turn whether investment is constrained by finance, complementary factors, government 
failure or market failure. 
 
E.   IS GROWTH CONSTRAINED BY FINANCE? 
The banking sector has undergone substantial reforms since the 1980s with foreign 
investors entering the market from 1994.  Deregulation has increased the number of 
banks from two in 1994 to nine in 2008.  Despite this, in the ICA survey (WB, 2006) 
businesses quote “cost of finance” and “access to finance” as the top two most severe 
constraints after macroeconomic stability. Furthermore informal firms report that “access 
to finance” is their most serious constraint.  While real lending interest rates have been - 28 - 
 
decreasing with improvements in the fiscal position since 2004, interest rates and 
nominal spreads still remain very high compared to peers. 
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       Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF 
 
Since reform, private investment has shown some elasticity to the real lending rate 
(although as already discussed the data is patchy):  private investment collapsed during 
the high inflation and high interest rates of 1995-2003, and NSO data suggests a strong 
recovery associated with lower interest rates from 2004. 
 
For the informal sector which includes rural smallholders, access to finance is reported as 
the most important constraint to growth
12.  In 2004, 14% of rural households had access 
to a loan but only 4% from a formal financial institution (IHS, 2005).  Rural households 
have an exceptionally low asset base – only 26% of own a bed, 2% own an oxcart (ibid) – 
which greatly impedes self-financed investment.  The PVA (WB, 2006) argues that 
illiquidity prevents investment, since farmers revert to traditional crop varieties using 
minimal inputs.  The authors perform a regression into the determinants of yield 
efficiency and conclude that liquidity considerations through credit or assets have the 
strongest effect of all variables on the yields of both maize and tobacco
13.  Similarly a 
regression performed on the determinants of commercial cropping, found that liquidity 
factors were also strongly associated with the decision to grow cash crops
14.  The 
significance of the smallholder liquidity constraint is illustrated by the substantial supply 
response created by the Input Subsidy Program since 2006. 
 
Savings Supply 
Do high interest rates result from a shortage of savings?  Real deposit rates have hovered 
around zero since 2004 indicating that banks have made little effort to attract savings.  
                                                 
 
12 84% of informal firms reported access to finance as a serious obstacle to growth (ICA, WB, 2006) 
13 p179, Malawi PVA Volume II, World Bank, 2006 
14 P209, ibid - 29 - 
 
Additionally growth is weakly correlated with the current account deficit (R
2=0.055) 
signaling a weak output response to external savings.  These findings imply that formal 
sector investment is unlikely to be constrained by the supply of savings. 
Financial Intermediation 
It follows that high interest rates must therefore be due to poor financial intermediation.  
Malawi has a shallow financial sector compared to peers indicated by low levels of credit 
to the private sector (9% of GDP in 2006) which has shown modest improvement since 
2003 as public borrowing reduced. 
 
Figure 25: Credit to the private and public sectors 
Source: WDI, comparative figures are for 2006 
 
Nominal spreads (lending rate minus deposit rate) are extremely high at over 20%, the 
highest of comparators, and only improving slowly. 
 































































































Although spreads have improved recently due to lower reserve requirement and 
improvements in loan quality, they have remained high due to overhead costs, and not 
because of a lack of competition (FSAP, 2007).  Overhead costs are in turn driven by the 
size of financial institutions which prevent economies of scale, and by the low relative 
productivity of bank employees.  According to the FSAP, bank employees are paid well 
(with an average dollar wage 3.5 greater than that of bank staff in Uganda) but perform 
poorly against regional averages in terms of interest income per employee or loan/ - 30 - 
 
deposit accounts per employee.  Despite this, bank profits have been extremely high 
largely due to non-interest income from the foreign exchange business
15. 
 
The rise in the number of banks, recent product innovations and the extension of the 
ATM network should all help to improve access and eventually the cost of finance.   
However the poor performance in managing overheads together with the limited reach of 
the financial system into rural areas strongly suggests that weak financial intermediation 
currently constrains to growth.  The high cost and low relative productivity of staff may 
also signal a general bottleneck in the availability of skills. 
 
F.  IS GROWTH CONSTRAINED BY A LACK OF COMPLEMENTARY FACTORS? 
Domestic Road Network 
Relative to the country’s area, Malawi compares favorably with its peers in the size of its 
road network in both paved and unpaved roads.   Paved road density per capita is also 
relatively high, but road density per capita for all roads is at the bottom of the comparator 
table.  The topography of Malawi - being around 3.5 times longer from North to South 
than from East to West – means that a smaller road network is required per unit of area in 
order to connect population centers than a country more regular in shape. 
 
Figure 27: Road density and road usage 











Vehicles/km of paved road
People/km of paved road  
Source: WDI 
 
The road network has the lowest use by vehicles per kilometer than any of its peers and is 
currently in reasonable condition.  According to the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development, 95% of paved roads and 65% of unpaved roads are currently in good or 
fair condition
16.  Although the low density of total roads per capita signals room for 
                                                 
 
15 Return on average assets (ROAA) reached 6.4% in 2006 making Malawian banks some of the most 
profitable in the world.  Banks seem to benefit from cartel rents in the foreign exchange market (FSAP, 
2007)  
16 Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Annual Economic Report, 2008 - 31 - 
 
improvement, it is unlikely that the domestic road network is currently a binding 
constraint to growth.  However, as discussed later in the chapter on spatial dimensions to 
growth, the road investments likely to have the highest impact on agricultural growth are 
feeder roads in areas with high agronomic potential and only moderate connectivity to 
major cities. 
Import-Export Infrastructure  
The areas immediately adjacent to Malawi in neighboring countries have relatively low 
populations - Eastern Zambia and North-Western Mozambique – resulting in limited 
potential for regional trade with direct neighbors.  As a result most imports and exports 
require international shipping giving Malawi a dependence on transit countries for 
infrastructure, procedures and the logistics performance of foreign ports. 
 
In the absence of a comprehensive transport study, it is difficult to obtain reliable data on 
the cost of trade transport and hence establish whether transport infrastructure currently 
constrains growth – either for the export sector or for import intensive industries for the 
domestic market.  Faye et al (2004) estimated that total transport costs as a proportion of 
exports were as high as 55% making Malawi an exceptional outlier even among 
landlocked countries.  Taken at face value, this data would imply that weak trade 
infrastructure was a binding constraint on growth, and that investment was likely to 
respond strongly to improvements in regional infrastructure. 
 
Yet other sources do not corroborate these findings.  Firstly using 2006 IFS data, the cost 
of transport and insurance as a proportion of imports
17 puts Malawi among comparators 
at about 15%.  Secondly the Doing Business Indicators also rank Malawi as comparable 
to peers for the cost of importing/ exporting a twenty foot container.  The DBI data also 
shows a significant premium on importing caused by the trade deficit, since the number 
of import journeys outnumbers export journeys.  Thirdly anecdotal evidence from the 
main commodity exporters put transport costs at between five and ten percent of export 
value (see Trade Facilitation and Transport chapter). 
 
                                                 
 
17 That is (imports (CIF) – imports (FOB)) / imports (FOB) - 32 - 
 
Figure 28: Comparative costs of trade transport 








Source:CIF/FOB: 2006 IFS,  Malawi figures from NSO; Container trade costs DBI, World Bank 2008 
 
It is thus unlikely that, in the aggregate, the cost of trade transport is a binding constraint 
to investment.  However a significant proportion of Malawi’s exports are shipped via 
feeder ports in Mozambique subjecting them to long delays.  The railway route to Nacala 
is principally used to export sugar and import fertilizer and includes a damaged 77km 
stretch which takes up to eight hours to pass and is often closed in heavy rains. 
 
Table 4: Routes to the sea 
Port Distance    Shipment  cost  Duration 
Beira  948 km  100-150 $/t  3 days transit by road – subject to delays 
Nacala  989 km  80 $/t  10 days transit by rail – subject to extreme delays 
Durban  2,323 km  300 $/t  Time-sensitive products 
         Source: MEPD 2008, World Bank staff estimates  
 
The rail link to Beira has not been repaired since the Mozambican war, and transit 
procedures can often add excessive delays of up to 15 days to shipments.  Additionally 
Beira is a shallow water port requiring container ships to anchor offshore serviced by 
smaller shuttle vessels.  Beira is also nearing its current throughput capacity as export 
production in Mozambique continues to expand. 
 
Malawi thus has access to cheap transport for robust non-time critical export cargoes 
such as tobacco and sugar at a cost of high risk of delays and inventory losses in 
switching transport.  Transport for time-sensitive or environment-sensitive goods is 
significantly more expensive.  Textile exports to South Africa are charged at $5,000 per 
forty foot container
18 – higher than the average export cost of any comparator country in 
the 2008 DBI data. 
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While evidence is not yet sufficient, it is possible then that trade transport costs for time-
sensitive exports is currently abnormally high for Malawi and that this is a constraint to 
export-sector growth.  If not currently binding, it is highly likely to become so 
imminently, as Beira and Dar approach the limits of their throughput.  Either way, it is 
clear that it is extremely important for Malawi to ensure that it has rapid and cost-
effective access to efficient ports able to handle its trade flows in the medium term.  The 
guarantee of such access is likely to require coordinated regional investment and the 
establishment of a common and efficiently implemented transit regime. 
Power Infrastructure 
Current energy generation is at full capacity in Malawi.  Whilst the immediate pressure 
for power has been temporarily improved by repairing a broken power plant at Tedzani, 
net peak load already exceeds installed capacity resulting in extensive load shedding.  
These outages are expected to become more severe as demand is forecasted to accelerate 
sharply after 2010.  Malawi generates nearly all of its grid-power by hydroelectric 
stations and has a current generating capacity of 263 megawatts.  The Tedzani scheme is 
scheduled to be reintroduced by the end of 2008 restoring national supply to the installed 
capacity of 283 megawatts. 
 
Figure 29: Projection of peak demand and generating capacity 
 
                Source: ESCOM, 2008 
 
The lack of generating margin above peak load is already having significant impact on 
businesses.  Power outages are estimated to be responsible for median sales losses of 
10% across Malawi, significantly higher than the SSA average of 1%.  For those firms 
without a generator, around 50% of Malawian firms, median sales losses are even higher 
at an estimated 20%.  
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Figure 30: Sales losses due to power outages and firms with generators 










Median sales losses due to power 
outages










% of firms with generator
 
                Source: Malawi Investment Climate Assessment, 2006 
 
Quality of electricity supply was cited as the forth most serious obstacle to growth by 
firms in the ICA (World Bank, 2006) and as the primary obstacle given by the 2008 
Malawi business climate survey conducted by the Malawian Chamber of Commerce.   
Additionally there have been specific investment decisions negatively influenced by 
electricity supply.  Inconsistent quality of supply was cited by cigarette manufacturer 
BAT for moving its operation out of Malawi; the proposed extraction of titanium heavy 
sands from the lake was cancelled for the same reason; and similarly several potential 
textile investments were never realized.  Power outages damage product quality in the 
dairy industry, require extensive cleaning of equipment in the plastics industry, and result 
in high losses in thread spinning (where consistent power is required to produce even 
width of threads).  Firms go to expensive lengths to get around the constraint.  Paladin, a 
mining company in the process of commissioning the uranium mine at Kayelekera, is 
using diesel generators at a operating cost greatly higher than the industrial electricity 
tariff. 
 
The state electricity company is currently unable to provide a reliable source of power to 
businesses resulting in significant losses and deterring investment in power sensitive 
industry.  The lack of reliable power supply significantly lowers social returns and hence 
is likely to be a binding constraint to growth. 
Irrigation and Rainfall 
The vast majority of agricultural production is rain-fed.  Historically Malawi has 
experienced serious droughts (1992, 1994, 1997, 2002, 2005) and floods, both of which 
have impeded agricultural productivity, damaging both agricultural land and crops. This 
rainfall variability is thought to have intensified risk-averse behavior by farmers and 
investors in agricultural industries and services, limiting diversification into other cash 
crops. 
 
How much does rainfall contribute to economic growth?  Although a total drought clearly 
collapses all agriculture (and hence GDP) the data suggests that different rainfall 
requirements of different crops probably diversifies the economy’s overall sensitivity to a - 35 - 
 
single rainfall pattern.  The Malawi Maize Index (MMI) is a measure of rainfall tuned to 
the specific requirements of the maize crop.  In Figure 31, the MMI correlates positively 
and closely with maize production per capita (R
2=67%) however this index exhibits near 
zero correlation to the per capita tobacco harvest.  Rainfall – as expressed by the MMI – 
is critical to food security but transmits limited volatility through to growth.  Using data 
from 1990 to 2008 growth in GDP per capita regressed against MMI had an R
2 
coefficient of 19%.   
 
Figure 31: Rainfall and crop production 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Tobacco Control Commission, Malawi Meteorological Service 
 
Nevertheless the effect of rainfall on food security has not provoked much investment in 
irrigation. Irrigation hedges against rainfall variability and raises productivity but 
allowing an additional cropping season(s) yet only 20% of potentially irrigable land is 
irrigated.  The intensification of small-scale agriculture will inevitably require investment 
in irrigation (treadle or petrol pumps) since food security for an expanding population are 
conditional on raising productivity in agriculture. However irrigation in itself is unlikely 
to be a binding constraint on growth.  Rather the lack of irrigation is more likely to be a 
symptom of general low investment prevented by other constraints such as weak human 
capital, rural illiquidity or low profitability due to inefficiencies in the marketing chain. 
Human Capital 
Primary and secondary education has been one of the top priorities for the government 
over recent years, and working alongside donors, significant steps forward have been 
made in school building, introducing new curricula and expanding Teacher Training 
Colleges. Yet primary education remains highly stressed in Malawi.  The introduction of 
Universal Primary Education in 1994 caused an immediate 43% jump in enrolment 
without corresponding expansion of teachers or classrooms.  As a result the ratio of 
teachers to pupils is the lowest of comparators at 1:76; and classrooms to pupils at 1:107 
(Malawi Education Statistics, 2006).  Less than half of children complete their first four 
years in school, which is also the lowest among comparators although overall completion 
rates are slightly higher than those of Uganda and Rwanda.  Secondary enrolment is 
comparable to peers, but tertiary enrolment per capita is by far the weakest of all 
comparator countries. - 36 - 
 




Does this weak performance constrain growth, or is it just a symptom of 
underdevelopment?  In addition to low enrolment, the quality of education is also very 
poor.  The Southern and East African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality 
(SACMEQ) has undertaken large-scale
19 standardized tests for standard 6 pupils across 
the region.  Figure 33 show Malawi’s performance in numeracy and literacy.  Malawi 
scores lowest of its peer group in both the average scores which are rebased to a mean of 
500 and standard deviation of 100, and for the percentage of pupils attaining “level 5” or 
above in the tests.  Level 5 is defined by SACMEQ as “competent numeracy” and 
“inferential reading” for literacy.  In this second chart, the percentage of children 
attaining “competent numeracy” was 0.2% - too low to be visible on the chart. 
 
Figure 33: Primary education quality 
Source: SACMEQ II, 2005 
                                                 
 
19 SACMEQ II administered tests to 2333 standard 6 students in Malawi in 2002. - 37 - 
 
 
This extremely poor performance signals that the educational system is likely to be part 
of the cause as well as a symptom of low development.  There is some direct evidence 
that education is constraining growth.  Data from the IHS (NSO, 2005) shows that 
household tobacco income is strongly correlated with the educational level of the 
household head, conforming the findings of the PVA that better educated farmers are able 
to understand the risks and farming practices of cash-cropping
20.  The same dataset 
reveals that household expenditure is strongly associated with the education level 
achieved by the head of a household. 
 
Figure 34: The economic returns to education 
Source: IHS, 2005 
 
The ICA (World Bank, 2006) ranks shortage of skilled workers as the eighth most serious 
obstacle to growth after macro-instability, finance, power, tax, and crime.  Other indirect 
evidence includes the high proportions of formal sector businesses that have non-
Malawians in key technical, managerial or ownership posts; and as already discussed low 
productivity and high salaries in the financial sector relative to comparator countries 
signal artificially high returns to business skills. 
 
This data signals that there is a strong probability that the poor quality and access to 
education currently constrains growth in Malawi, and an even greater probability that it 
will become a constraint in the medium term.  Either way, given the long lead times of 
educational reform, it is critical that government and donors intensify their efforts to 
improve quality and access particularly of primary and tertiary education. 
Land 
Malawi has a high population density which results in small land plots and a deterioration 
of soil fertility from overuse.  However comparator countries face similar circumstances, 
and Malawi still has more than double the arable land per capita of Asian countries such 
as Vietnam.  Arable land per capita is comparable to peers at a fifth of a hectare, and 
                                                 
 
20 Poverty and trade in agriculture commodities, Malawi PVA Volume II, World Bank, 2006 - 38 - 
 
Malawi’s land expansion has been the second fastest among comparators averaging 2.2% 
per year between 1980 and 2005. 
 
 Table 5: Land in comparator countries 
 
Arable land per capita 
(hectares) 
Total land per capita 
 (hectares) 
Zambia 0.46  6.36 
Namibia 0.40  40.2 
Benin 0.32  1.26 
Tanzania 0.24  2.24 
Mozambique 0.21  3.75 
Malawi  0.20  0.69 
Uganda 0.19  0.66 
Kenya 0.15  1.56 
Rwanda 0.13  0.26 
Burundi 0.12  0.31 
Vietnam 0.08  0.36 
Bangladesh 0.05  0.08 
Source: WDI, 2006 
 
Additionally some land is lying fallow as households are only cultivating about 80% of 
their plots.  The IHS (2005) reported that on average household plots were about 1.2ha of 
which 1ha was cultivated.  The PVA (World Bank, 2006) further concludes that the 
relationship between household wealth and land holding size is not very strong indicating 
that availability of land is not an immediate binding constraint on smallholder incomes
21.  
This is confirmed by the experience of Asian countries which surmounted the problems 
of population density through irrigation and technology.  Even after the expansion of 
arable area ceased, the intensification of smallholder farming has provided the underlying 
driver of diversified growth. 
 
Much greater reserves of unutilized land still exist in the estate sector.  A 1998 study 
estimated that 45% of the 1.1 million hectares of estate land was not under cultivation
22.  
Low government rents have encouraged the retention of this land for speculation.   
Furthermore Malawi has made significant progress in developing a land policy – yet to be 
enacted into law - which brings all ownership under a single land tenure arrangement.  
The short-term land rental market is extremely active and expropriation of land has not 
been, or perceived to be a problem for investors (ICA, 2006).  Although the 
regularization of land tenure and the resettlement of idle estate lands is a priority, it is 
unlikely that access to land is currently a constraint to growth.  
  
 
                                                 
 
21 Agricultural growth and productivity in Malawi, , Malawi PVA Volume II, World Bank, 2006 
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G.  IS GROWTH CONSTRAINED BY GOVERNMENT OR MARKET FAILURE? 
After 2004, as already discussed, the government made excellent progress in establishing 
price-stability and fiscal balance.  Inflation fell from over eighty percent to under ten, and 
Malawi’s fiscal position has improved to under 4% of GDP.  The overvaluation of the 
exchange rate however, is likely to continue to operate as a binding constraint to growth 
for the tradeable sector and domestic manufacturing that competes with exports.  At its 
current level, the real exchange rate prevents the appropriation of social returns by acting 
as a tax on exports and a subsidy on imports.  Additionally the practice of step 
devaluations creates uncertainty for exporters who postpone the repatriation of foreign 
exchange if they perceive that a devaluation is imminent.  This creates additional 
shortages of foreign exchange and artificially amplifies the foreign exchange effect of the 
devaluation. 
Ex-ante Risks 
Is growth constrained by ex-ante risks – that is, the perception by an investor that they 
will not be able to appropriate returns?  Despite the progress in price stability, investor 
perception of macroeconomic risk persists.  The ICA (World Bank, 2006) ranks it as the 
most severe obstacle to growth; and it contributes the weakest score to Malawi’s Global 
Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum, 2008).  However, Malawi has no 
history of expropriations, scores relatively well on corruption indicators and is perceived 
as having high institutional quality when benchmarked against peers.  The country ranks 
119
th out of 134 on the Global Competitiveness Index, but its institutions are ranked 51
st.  
Entrepreneurs and business owners mention state predation but relative to the level of the 
general business environment it is unlikely to be a deterrent to investment. 
 
Figure 35: Ex-ante risks to investment 
Source: Transparency International 2008, World Economic Forum 
 
A stronger case for ex-ante risk exists in the expectation of government price setting in 
agricultural produce and input markets.  The government has set minimum prices on 
tobacco and cotton, fixed buying and selling prices on maize, imposed export bans on 
soya and maize, and supported association pricing in paprika and chilies.  Representatives - 40 - 
 
of both buyers and producers in the tobacco industry have voiced support that minimum 
pricing at a cautious level can hedge producer risk and consequently ensure a better 
supply.  However the arbitrary and unilateral form of other interventions strongly 
discourages investment and is likely to have raised barriers to entry in those industries.  
The high fertilizer mark-up in Malawi compared to other countries is a possible 
confirmation of the effect of ex-ante risks. 
Microeconomic Environment 
The Doing Business Indicators (World Bank, 2008) show that Malawi does not have an 
unexpectedly poor business environment.  Malawi ranks in the middle of the comparator 
table for the general score on ease of doing business, and has relatively strong scores on 
taxes, employment regulations, and registrations/ licensing.  The elements that perform 
weakest are cross-border trading, contract enforcement and business closure.  Cross 
border trading scores poorly particularly because of the number of documents that are 
required to export.  The full DBI tables are presented in the appendix. 
 
Figure 36: Microeconomic environment 
Source: DBI, World Bank 2008 
 
Similarly the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, 2008) also show that, given its 
level of income per capita, Malawi scores reasonably on all dimensions, particularly: 
voice and accountability, rule of law, regulatory quality and political stability.   The 
survey indicators do not signal that microeconomic risks are binding constraints to 
growth. With the exceptions of arbitrary intervention in agricultural markets and the 
scope to streamline trade procedures, Malawi performs well against peers in its 
institutional and policy environment.  
Market Failure 
We have established that growth in Malawi is driven by agricultural exports, the majority 
of which are produced by smallholders.  And the real domestic price – often signaled by 
the price in the previous season - is a primary driver of the production response.  It 
follows therefore that an increase in farm-gate prices achieved through efficiencies in - 41 - 
 
input or product marketing chains will also stimulate growth by creating a production 
response.  
 
Is there market failure in agricultural input and product chains?  An analysis of the 
efficiency of agricultural value chains is presented in later chapters but outline results 
indicate that several market failures artificially lower smallholder profits.  Firstly, prices 
of fertilizer are higher in Malawi than Zambia or Mozambique.  This is partly explained 
by higher external transport costs, and poor timing in procurement arrangements, but it is 
also due to higher dealer mark-up – estimated at 16% in Malawi compared to 5% in 
Zambia and less in Mozambique.  Although it is not clear whether this is because of 
monopoly power or the ex-ante risk of government intervention preventing market entry, 
the high mark-up inhibits a growth response. 
 
Secondly large efficiency improvements are likely in product marketing chains.  The 
tobacco marketing process, being the dominant export, is a particular example of this.  
Most tobacco is sold at auction using the floors run by Auction Holdings Ltd (AHL).  
Smallholders pay transporters to bring their tobacco bails to an auction floor, which on 
arrival can wait for over three weeks on the back of a lorry before it clears the queue.  
Alternatively bails are deposited in a TAMA (Tobacco Association of Malawi) depot and 
transported later.  This protracted process results in significant losses to the grower.  The 
transporter charges not only for transport but also for the de-facto warehousing service 
that the truck provides; those directing the queue have ample opportunities for rent 
seeking; and bails left in depots are prone to theft (partial or total) or switching of the 
crop.  As a result the shadow price of avoiding the auction queues is high.  Producers will 
often sell tobacco at a huge discount to intermediate traders who take their place in the 
auction process.  Alternatively many growers prefer to export their crop informally to 
Mozambique or Zambia which have rural markets run by buyers.   Many of these operate 
contract farming, but Malawian growers often prefer to receive immediate payment at 
contract farming prices (with the cost of inputs deducted) than wait and sell on the 
auction floor in Malawi. 
 
Thirdly the spatial location of market centers has a strong impact on production response.  
Tobacco production clusters around the auction outlets of Lilongwe, Kasungu and Limbe, 
and despite high agronomic potential elsewhere, the IHS data (NSO, 2005) reveals that 
cropping intensity rapidly trails off with travel time to market centers.  The spatial 
dimensions to growth are discussed in a later chapter, but the clustering of export crop 
smallholders around market centers is also seen for sugar, tea and cotton. 
 
Because of the demonstrated supply response to farm gate prices, improving efficiencies 
in the value chain or in reducing travel times to product markets will feed directly into 
growth.  Although more work is required to establish the marketing chains with potential 
for improvements, there are strong signals that inefficiencies in tobacco marketing results 
in high additional costs to growers from transporters, traders and risks from rent seeking 
and theft.  - 42 - 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Malawi is an export-led economy.  Despite changes in the structure of agricultural 
production, and liberalization of prices, exchange and finance, a long standing 
relationship persists between export income and overall GDP.   The driver of the 
economy has been real domestic revenue from exports which has created growth by 
stimulating non-tradeable services, and to a limited extent import substituting 
industrialization.  Malawi has faced chronic deterioration in its terms of trade since the 
1970s but has recovered largely due to improvements in the real exchange rate and more 
recently the tobacco price.  The economy has proved highly sensitive to movements in 
both these variables since improvements (a) cause an immediate rise in real domestic 
export revenue which multiply through the rest of the economy; and (b) incentivize a 
production expansion by increasing tradeable returns. 
 
However there are strong signs that despite progress the real exchange rate is still 
overvalued.  Recent strong growth in the demand for consumer imports has failed to 
stimulate much of a response from domestic manufacturing.  There has been extremely 
poor progress in diversifying out of the traditional exports of tobacco, sugar and tea.  
There are widespread and persistent shortages of foreign exchange, low reserves and the 
current account has a higher deficit than any comparator economy.  Malawi is in effect 
running a fixed exchange rate system artificially overvalued not just from revenues from 
the booming tobacco sector, or aid which finances the capital account, but from 
government policy that incentivizes importing at the expense of exporting. 
 
1.  Growth is primarily driven by the domestic multiplier from export revenues. 
2.  Improvements in the real exchange rate since 1980 have been strongly beneficial 
to growth. 
3.  Growth transmission has run from agriculture to non-tradeable services and only 
minimally to domestic manufacturing.  This is despite strong demand for 
consumer imports. 
4.  Thus the exchange rate is still overvalued leading to a strong disincentive to 
invest in the tradeable sector or in import-substituting industrialization. 
5.  A macroeconomic winter 1995-2003 suppressed investment through high 
inflation and interest rates, which prevented growth transmission out of 
agriculture. 
6.  Malawi’s large current account deficit (14% GDP) is financed by aid. 
 
Aid inflows are substantial relative to the size of the external sector and have probably 
contributed to exchange rate appreciation.  This effect has been mitigated by the increase 
in direct public-sector imports particularly from the fertilizer subsidy.  But aid has had a 
limited effect on long-term productivity since it predominantly finances consumption and 
recurrent expenditure.   Expenditure data from the Ministry of Finance indicates that less - 43 - 
 
than 40 percent of aid is used for investment.  Without financing increases in 
productivity, aid risks doing long-term damage to growth by appreciating the currency 
and creating disincentives in the export sector.  Because of the centrality of the export 
sector to Malawi’s economy and its sensitivity to the real exchange rate, it is vital that the 
use of aid is realigned to support export-led growth. 
The most binding constraint on the economy is thus the real exchange rate which can 
only be ameliorated by a careful managed devaluation to ensure that price stability is 
maintained.  In addition, the analysis further identifies other constraints using the HRV 




Binding.  High overheads have created high real lending rates which 
currently constrain investment.  Very limited access to formal finance 
for smallholders reduces the production response of rural farmers to 
price signals. 
 
Power  Binding.  The lack of reliable power source significantly lowers social 
returns, and deters new investments in manufacturing and mining.  The 
lack of rural power additionally exacerbates deforestation. 
 
Education  Binding or imminently binding.  Extremely weak performance in 
quality and access, and evidence of high returns to primary education 
from cash cropping and tertiary from formal sector employment.   
Moderate signals of skills shortages from business surveys.  The long 
lead time of reforms suggest that the quality of primary education in 




Binding.  An increase in farm-gate prices achieved through efficiencies 
in input or product marketing chains stimulates growth by increasing 
the production response and the domestic multiplier.  Efficiency 
improvements are probable from regional infrastructure 
improvements, administrative barriers to trade, and the domestic input 
and marketing chains (particularly tobacco). 
 
Micro policy  Secondary. Government policy facing the firm generally performs well 
against peers with the exception of administrative barriers to trade and 
the unpredictability of interventions in agricultural prices.  Price 
interventions are likely to have raised ex-ante risk, creating monopoly 
rents and in turn raising the cost of inputs to farmers. 
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APPENDIX A – DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS 
 Kenya  Zambia  Uganda  Malawi Tanzania Mozam 
bique 
           
Ease of Doing Business Rank  72  116  118  127 130  134 
           
Starting a business  112  82  114  108 95  125 
    Procedures (number)  12  6  18  10 12  10 
    Time (days)  44  33  28  37 29  29 
    Cost (% of income per capita)  46.1  30.5  92  188.7 47.1  21.6 
    Min. capital (% of income per capita)  0  2.2  0  0 0  115.8 
           
Dealing with licenses  9  148  81  117 170  147 
    Procedures (number)  10  17  16  21 21  17 
    Time (days)  100  254  143  213 308  361 
    Cost (% of income per capita)  58.8  1518  811.8  189.2 2365.5  705 
           
Employing workers  66  121  11  90 151  162 
    Difficulty of Hiring Index  33  33  0  56 89  83 
    Rigidity of Hours Index  0  40  0  0 40  60 
    Difficulty of Firing Index  30  30  10  20 60  20 
    Rigidity of Employment Index  21  34  3  25 63  54 
    Nonwage labor cost (% of salary)  4  9  10  1 16  4 
    Firing costs (weeks of wages)  47  178  13  84 32  143 
           
Registering property  114  125  163  87 160  126 
    Procedures (number)  8  6  13  6 10  8 
    Time (days)  64  70  227  88 119  42 
    Cost (% of property value)  4.2  9.6  4.6  3.3 5.3  8.1 
           
Getting Credit  13  97  158  84 115  97 
    Legal Rights Index  8  6  3  7 5  3 
    Credit Information Index  4  0  0  0 0  3 
    Public registry coverage (% adults)  0  0  0  0 0  0.9 
    Private bureau coverage (% adults)  1.5  0  0  0 0  0 
           
Protecting investors  83  64  122  64 83  33 
    Disclosure Index  3  3  2  4 3  5 
    Director Liability Index  2  6  5  7 4  4 
    Shareholder Suits Index  10  7  5  5 8  9 
    Investor Protection Index  5  5.3  4  5.3 5  6 
           
Paying Taxes  154  30  55  78 104  72 
    Payments (number)  41  37  33  30 48  37 
    Time (hours)  432  132  237  370 172  230 
    Profit tax (%)  32.5  1.7  15.7  30.4 20.2  27.7 
    Labor tax and contributions (%)  6.8  10.4  11.3  1.1 18  4.5 
    Other taxes (%)  11.6  4  5.3  0.7 6.1  2.1 
    Total tax rate (% profit)  50.9  16.1  32.3  32.2 44.3  34.3 
           
Trading across borders  148  160  141  161 100  140 
    Documents for export (number)  9  8  6  12 5  8 
    Time for export (days)  29  53  39  45 24  27 
    Cost to export (US$ per container)  1955  2098  2940  1623 1212  1155 
    Documents for import (number)  8  11  7  10 7  10 
    Time for import (days)  37  64  37  54 30  38 
   Cost to import (US$ per container)  1995  2840  2990  2500 1425  1185 
           
Enforcing contracts  107  86  119  135 35  138 
    Procedures (number)  44  35  38  42 38  31 
    Time (days)  465  471  535  432 462  1010 
    Cost (% of debt)  26.7  38.7  44.9  142.4 14.3  142.5 
           
Closing a business  76  84  48  135 109  134 
    Time (years)  4.5  2.7  2.2  2.6 3  5 
    Cost (% of estate)  22  9  30  30 22  9 
    Recovery rate (cents on the dollar)  31  28.4  41  13.2 20.5  13.9 
            
Source: Doing Business Indicators, 2008          
 